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Preface 
This deliverable presents a first comparison of the overlap between human pressures and priority areas in 
the different MESMA Case Studies (CS). The annexes to D 3.6 (Zoning Plan – Evaluation of spatial 
management options for the case studies), based on the application of the generic MESMA Framework 
provide a case per case list of the different uses of the sea, and a selection of possible conflicts with other 
uses. 
(https://teamsites.wur.nl/sites/mesma/MESMA%20output%20incl%20deliverables/Forms/AllItems.aspx?
RootFolder=%2Fsites%2Fmesma%2FMESMA%20output%20incl%20deliverables%2FMESMA%20Deliverabl
es%2FD3%2E6) 
Given the very high heterogeneity of the CS, and the resulting heterogeneity in framework results, a 
comparison of these uses and conflicts was anticipated by the MESMA community to be extremely 
complicated, with a high risk in (again) reflecting the CS heterogeneity. As such, a discussion during the 
MESMA General Assembly in Athens (October 2011) concluded that a meaningful way forward was to 
analyse possibly conflicting uses, that occur in the majority of the CS, or are expected to occur in the near 
future as a conqequence of developing European legislations. 
Such an example is to be found in the possible conflict between nature conservation (designation of 
MPAs), and the growing demand for the installation of offshore renewable energy installations. While 
both uses aim to the increase the sustainable use of the Earth’s resource, they do compete for space in 
the already well-exploited marine areas. In addition, this competition is a generally occurig phenomenon, 
as witnessed by the fact that the majority of the CS were involved in this comparison. 
The text below reflects the results of the comparison of the position of nature conservation and offshore 
renewable energy developers, based on the input of 11 (sub) Case Studies. This input was analysed using 
game theory. This allows for developing a model reflecting the ideal situation that is compared with the 
actual situation. Based on this, the underlying reasons for the divergence from an ideal situation can be   
deduced, and recommendations for futher implementation of both uses in the marine area can be 
formulated.  
The analysis was based on input delivered from 11 (sub)CS, that was analysed by Zacharoula Kyriazi, Frank 
Maes, Steven Degraer, Jan Vanaverbeke and Magda Vincx. The data needed for this analysis are based on 
the work performed for MESMA WP2 and WP6. Hence, the data needed to underpin a correct scientific 
analysis were only available recently. The text below reflects the results of the analysis, and will be the 
basis for a manuscript that will be submitted to the peer-reviewed literature. Given the procedures of the 
peer-review process, the accepted paper will be slightly different from the text for this deliverable. As 
such, the final (published) text will be made available publicly, and uploaded to the MESMA sharepoint as 
well, and should then be considered as the final result of this analysis. 
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Offshore renewable energy and nature conservation at sea. 
Coexistence or exclusivity? 
1. Introduction  
Marine spatial planning (MSP) should provide an optimal space allocation of the economic and social 
potential of activities at sea, within the ecological carrying capacity of the marine ecosystem. In terrestrial 
planning, Forman [1] hypothesised that for any landscape, or major portion of the landscape, there is an 
optimal spatial combination of ecological values and land uses to maximise ecological integrity. Similarly, 
marine space being occupied by various users, offer benefits to the society and hence faces problems of 
overuse that can be managed as a common pool resource [2]. In the already overexploited sea, new 
needs create new uses, resulting in more pressures to natural systems. These marine uses interact 
between each other in a socioeconomic system. In turn the processes and systems that represent the 
natural system react to human interventions, or in other words interact with the aforementioned 
socioeconomic system. This phenomenon, subject to various lags, produces policy responses and finally a 
co-evolutionary process characterized by continuous feedback effects [3]. This process results in the 
creation of complex marine socioecological systems [4][5][2][6]. According to Berkes & Folke [7] the term 
socioecological system emphasises the idea that humans form part of nature and that the delineation 
between social and ecological systems is artificial. Hence the existence of these systems and their 
underlying interactions enhances the need to understand and manage them in an efficient way. Marine 
spatial planning is so far the most appropriate tool proposed for satisfying this need.  
There are two interlinked types of interactions influencing the evolution of marine socio ecological 
systems. Above all are the interactions at policy level that influence interactions at the ecosystem level. 
Finally both types of these interactions affect continuously the organizational context of the marine 
environment in space and time. A recent, though well-known example of these interactions are those 
between the growing demand for offshore renewable energy (ORE) and the well-established duty to 
protect the marine environment, by inter alia nature conservation (NC).  
ORE (and its related institutions) is a relatively new ‘player’ appealing for the allocation of space. Directive 
2009/28/EC on the promotion of renewable energy from renewable sources aims to achieve the EU target 
of 20% renewable energy in energy consumption by 2020 [8]. The renewable energy target is distributed 
among Member States (MS) based on GDP, investment in renewable energy prior to 2005 and standard 
increase in renewable energy (e.g. target for Belgium is 13%; for Sweden 49%). MS develop National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs). Today, the North Sea has the highest installed offshore wind 
energy capacity in the world, in particular in the southern part. It is expected that Belgian, Danish, British, 
German, Dutch and UK offshore wind farms will produce around 32 GW in 2020, mainly in the North Sea. 
Denmark and UK expect a production of respectively 4, 6 GW and 33 GW in 2025, and Germany 25 GW in 
2030, depending on economic and financial conditions. The WINDSPEED project concludes that a capacity 
of 135 GW of OWE in the central and southern North Sea is feasible by 2030, assuming that the NREAP 
projections of around 32 GW for the six North Sea countries involved are achieved in 2020 [9]. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) [10] and regional sea conventions (Barcelona Convention on 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea (1976) as amended [11]; Helsinki Convention of the Protection of 
the Baltic Sea (1992) [12]: Convention on the Protection of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR, 1992) [13] do 
not contain explicit provisions or restrictive elements for ORE installations regarding NC. The EU Habitats 
and Birds Directives do not necessary prohibit ORE; hence a system of assessment needs to apply.  When 
a planned project, either individually or in combination with other plans, is likely to have a significant 
effect on Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) under the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) [14] or Special 
Protection Areas (SPA) under the Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) [15] an appropriate assessment of its 
implications is necessary in the light of the site’s conservation objectives [16]. 
Both ORE and NC promote the achievement of environmental objectives, although from a different 
perspective. ORE contributes to the reduction of green house gases and is a mitigation measure under 
climate change, while NC contributes to halting the loss of biodiversity. However, it is not obvious that 
these two sectors are spatially compatible, although they may present a high compatibility in relation to 
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other sectors. In making decisions about compatibility and exclusivity, it is critical to quantify trade-offs. 
Importantly, the economic concept of “resource rent,” representing the value of marine space as a scarce 
resource, should be utilised in analysing such trade-offs [17]. This is not always feasible for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the calculation of costs and benefits of allocating areas for specific uses or for specific 
combinations of uses is complicated. ORE supports a profitable industry with monetary gains and losses, 
while NC is not explicitly an economic activity although it also produces gains and opportunity costs [18] 
[19]. Additionally, when a renewable energy facility is sited in an MPA, there is uncertainty about the non-
market values of potential effects of that activity to the main objectives of the MPA. The lack of property 
rights for alternative uses of marine space as a public resource adds to the complexity. Furthermore, ORE 
can benefit by expanding spatially in MPAs, but not from NC per se. On the contrary NC can lose assets in 
the short term by coexisting with ORE, but it can benefit in the long term since there are possibilities that 
more NC values will result both in ORE restricted access areas and in areas around them [20][21][22][23]. 
In other words the interdependence between ORE and NC is not equally divided and is difficult to 
calculate.  
2. Research strategy 
A variety of policy options and tools exist regarding the management of spatial overlaps between ORE and 
NC, along with their relevant interactions and interdependences. The latter can be summarised in three 
options or tools that are mostly combined, although they can be used independently: 
 ORE constructions can be based on the location selection under 
MSP[24][25][26][27][2][28][29][30][31] [16]. 
 Conducting Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs, Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIAs) and Appropriate Assessments, for the ORE construction and license approval. 
[32][33][34][2] 
 Coexistence of ORE and NC and parallel monitoring of NC features [34][35][36][37]    
Departing from the above policy options and tools, our analysis is focused on: a) the theoretic ideal ORE-
NC interactions; b) the trends for managing coexistence between ORE and NC at European level; c) 
balancing both ORE and NC interests to contribute to sustainability; d) a mechanism supporting the 
optimal use of marine space, when NC interests are involved. The study departs from game theoretic 
modelling to predict the ideal combination of policy options for the optimal use of a certain area where 
ORE and NC, as two players, are involved. Starting from a theoretical perspective, the model is tested in 
case studies reflecting current practice regarding ORE and NC.  Practice is described through empirical 
analysis of 11 locations identified in the FP7 European project MESMA. Details regarding each location can 
be found in the project’s official website www.mesma.org under WP3 “Case studies description”. The 
empirical analysis is taking into account: a) the options chosen by each case study to deal with 
interactions between ORE and NC; b) the factors that influence the strategies for each player per location; 
and consequently c) how the game changes in practice. Section 3 describes the tools and methods used, 
followed by section 4 where theoretical and empirical results are presented. Section 5 discusses the 
implications of the modelling exercise for the design of a mechanism for an optimal management of ORE 
and NC in case of interactions. Finally, in section 6 conclusions are drawn.  
3. Game theoretic modelling: tools and methods 
3.1 Model development 
3.1.1 Game theory contribution to marine spatial planning 
When more than one entity or agent (here ORE and NC) claims part of the marine space as a resource, 
game theory offers an appropriate method to analyze such type of management problems. 
Interdependency among the agents leads to collective action in which the contributions or efforts of one 
agent influence the actions of other agent, thus implying a strategic interaction. Game theory can 
contribute to an improved understanding of the decision making process in case of strategic 
MESMA Monitoring and Evaluation of Spatially Managed Areas 
6 
interdependences, allowing policy makers to formulate better policy. The game-theoretic 
conceptualization of strategic interactions has a very high degree of prima facie plausibility for the study 
of policy interactions. At the same time, these interactive conditions are most likely to be ignored by 
disciplines such as welfare economics or systems analysis that are primarily involved in substantive policy 
research. They tend to ascribe policy choices to a unitary "policymaker" or "legislator" rather than to 
strategic interactions among independent agents [38]. It is therefore important to assess social 
acceptability of alternative sets of management actions or strategies against a range of criteria such as 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and fairness across different stakeholder interests [2]. 
We depart from the assumption that game theory can be a more appropriate approach for evaluating 
above types of spatial decision making, instead of a monetary oriented analysis ( (i.e; cost benefit 
analysis). Game theory is a tool for analyzing strategic interactions between a finite number of agents. 
Many models have been developed, particularly in the field of resource sharing. Reference papers on the 
management of Common Pool Resources (CPR) are based on a game theoretical approach 
[39][40][41][42]. Others deal with the optimal sharing of fisheries [43] [44], the optimal allocation of 
water resources [45] and cooperative or competitive behavior between NC organizations [46] [47]. The 
fundamentals of game theory thinking can be summarized in two concepts: strategic interaction and 
equilibrium outcomes. The first implies that agents are aware of their interdependence. Hence, in arriving 
at their own choices each agent will try to anticipate the choices of the others, knowing that the other will 
act the same. Equilibrium outcomes e.g. Nash Equillibrium are those in which no player can improve his or 
her own payoff by unilaterally changing to another strategy [48]. 
3.1.2 Conceptual model 
The assumption is that the area at stake has a high ecological value and is claimed for an economic activity 
such as ORE. Essentially the ORE developer is the one who would start the game for a number of reasons, 
either  a) he does not own the area; or b) would claim the area only if ORE has no alternative areas to 
choose from. Another assumption is that there is uncertainty whether ORE will harm the environment of 
the area or not. In a search to the most appropriate spatial decision that ensures sustainability, there are 
two main options: either coexistence (cooperation) of ORE and NC or the exclusive use of a certain marine 
zone by one of them (competition). The spatial allocation of ORE facilities and NC measures does not 
always require an exclusive use of their relevant marine space. On the contrary, coexistence might be not 
only feasible but also- under some conditions- desirable. The fact that there is strategic interaction 
between the two agents creates the basis for a non-cooperative, or a cooperative game and hence 
considerations of cooperative management are largely the point. What is important here is that players 
will be willing to cooperate if, and only if, by doing so they can achieve an outcome at least as good as by 
acting alone - a condition referred to as collective rationality [49]. 
3.1.3 Game theoretical modelling 
The game is a two person static game where decisions or moves of each player are taken once and 
simultaneously, while each player has full knowledge about possible strategies of the other (complete 
information). After the players simultaneously choose strategies, they receive payoffs that depend on the 
combination of the chosen strategies. Here the payoffs of the strategies are presented in a matrix 
(strategic form or normal form) and represented in ordinal numbers. Although it is stated that the players 
choose their strategies simultaneously in a normal-form game, it does not imply that they necessarily act 
simultaneously: it suffices that each choose his or her strategy without knowledge of the others' choices 
[48]. Moreover the game is a non-zero sum game. In non-zero sum games, aggregate payoffs are different 
from zero. Furthermore, non-zero sum games are not strictly competitive games. The solution of the 
game should be a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium means “no one has incentives to deviate from it”. 
In a two-player game, the solution is found as follows: for each player, and for each feasible strategy for 
that player, the other player's best response to that strategy and vice versa is determined.  
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3.2 Model comparison  
The model is tested in case studies reflecting current practice regarding ORE and NC.  Practice is described 
through empirical analysis of 11 locations identified in the FP7 European project MESMA. Details 
regarding each location can be found in the project’s official website www.mesma.org under WP3 “Case 
studies description”.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The ORE-NC game 
NC and ORE claim the same space at sea. ORE is represented by the developer who applies for an ORE 
project in an MPA. NC is represented by the relevant authority, responsible for the conservation and 
management of this MPA. Each player aspires to realize its own objectives: a) maximization of the used 
space; b) minimization of costs.   
The sets of strategies for each player are as follows:  
NC authority has two strategies.  
 NC1 (NC-allow): the authority has the intention to allow for ORE developments in designated 
MPAs. 
 NC2 (NC-not allow): the authority does not have the intention to allow for ORE developments in 
designated MPAs. 
ORE developer has two strategies 
 ORE1 (ORE-apply): ORE developer chooses to apply for ORE developments inside designated 
MPAs. 
 ORE2 (ORE not-apply): ORE developer chooses not to apply for ORE developments inside 
designated MPAs. 
 
Ordinal numbers for payoffs are set as follows: 2=gain without compromise, 1=gain with compromise, 
0=indifference, -1=cost balanced with some gain, -2=absolute cost. 
 
In this game it is not sure whether ORE will harm the environment or not. Even if studies (through EIAs) 
prove that ORE will not harm the environment, this is not absolutely sure (uncertainty). Hence, it is 
assumed that there is a possibility that ORE may harm the environment in this game, although the precise 
qualification of harm is not incorporated in the present analysis. 
 
 
Table 1.The theorethical outcome of the ORE-NC game 
Uncertainty  
of harming 
NC1 NC2 
ORE1 2,-2 1,2 
ORE2 -2,-1 -1,1 
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The following combinations of strategies shown in table 1 are analysed: 
ORE1, NC1= (2,-2): The developer is allowed to build ORE in the MPA so ORE1 gets the highest payoff i.e. 
2. However the authority is uncertain whether ORE will harm or not, so engaging NC1 is the worst strategy 
as response to ORE1 and it gets -2 
ORE1, NC2= (1,2): ORE1 remains the best strategy for the developer, but since the authority does not 
allow ORE in the area the payoff of ORE1 is reduced to 1. On the other hand NC2 is the best strategy 
which is an application of the precautionary principle when the developer applies to build ORE in the 
certain area. So NC2 gets 2. 
ORE2, NC1= (-2,-1): ORE2 is the worst strategy for the developer to choose when ORE is allowed in the 
area so it gets -2. On the other hand NC1 is still the worst for the authority but now the developer does 
not apply for a project. So NC1 gets a lighter negative payoff i.e. -1 
ORE2, NC2=(-1,1): The payoff of ORE2 becomes better than before since now the authority does not allow 
for projects in the area. The payoff of NC2 becomes less than before since the developer is not interested 
to apply. 
    
The equilibrium of this game is (ORE1, NC2) that means that the ORE developer chooses to apply for a 
project in the MPA but the NC authority doesn’t allow. This combination of strategies supports exclusivity 
among uses i.e. the zone is used only for NC purposes. However according to the rest of the analysis this is 
in contrast to the optimal use of marine space which supports coexistence whenever possible.  
 
4.2 The empirical analysis 
The above theoretical model provides a representation of the reality if decisions were taken under 
rational behaviour of the ORE developer and the NC authority, both having only above mentioned moves 
available. In this section a comparison between the theoretical model and the real world is made using 11 
locations of the MESMA project. Table 2 includes a brief description of each location’s NC considerations 
such as environmental prerequisites for licensing, whether coexistence between ORE and NC is followed 
as a practice and some numbers justifying the latter. 
Except for the Barents Sea, environmental impact assessment is a prerequisite in all the locations for 
granting permission to ORE developers. In the Baltic Sea (Sweden and Poland) and the Celtic Sea a 
separate permit is required for Natura 2000 sites. For the BPNS, the Celtic Sea and the PFOW, the 
existence of spatial plans works as a guide to which areas should be avoided from the beginning for 
permit applications. 
In five out of eleven locations, ORE is not prohibited in MPAs but until now MPAs have been avoided by 
ORE. In four locations ORE is allowed and actually built (or planned to be built) in MPAs. In one location 
ORE is not prohibited in MPAs, but there are no (plans to construct) ORE installations anywhere yet. In 
one case (the BPNS) ORE is not allowed to be built in MPAs. 
In the game above, the equilibrium is when the ORE developer applies for a project in an MPA, while this 
is not allowed by the NC authority. According to the data in table 2, ORE is not prohibited in MPAs for all 
cases except for the BPNS. This is happening for the BPNS because civil engineering in NC areas is 
prohibited by the legislation on MPAs [50]. Furthermore the granting of concessions for renewable energy 
are restricted to special ORE zones in the “Master plan” [51]. So according to the game above, in the BPNS 
the equilibrium ORE2, NC2 i.e. neither the developer nor the NC authority is interested to coexist. 
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Table 2NC implications in ORE licensing in European areas 
Location NC considerations of ORE projects 
ORE projects 
applications 
ORE 
projects 
licensed 
ORE projects 
rejected in MPAs 
ORE projects  
approved in MPAs 
Sweden 
SEA, EIA, Special permit for Natura 2000 
sites, Coexistence applied 15 4 1 
1 (NC designation 
after ORE 
approval) 
Poland 
SEA, EIA, Special permit for Natura 2000 
sites, Coexistence avoided 
14 areas proposed (no 
aprovals yet) 0 0 0 
Barents Sea SEA, Coexistence but no plans 
15 areas proposed (no 
applications yet) 0 0 0 
Basque 
Country SEA, EIA, Coexistence avoided 1 1 0 0 
Belgian part of 
the north sea 
(BPNS) 
SEA, EIA,  Special permit for Natura 2000 
sites, MSP guidance, Coexistence 
prohibited   25 4 1 0 
Greece SEA, EIA, Coexistence avoided 35 2 0 0 
Pentland Firth 
and Orkney 
Waters (PFOW) 
SEA, EIA, MSP guidance, coexistence 
applied 
6 wave and 5 tidal 
energy sites (2 coincide 
with MPAs) 0 0 0 
Southern 
North Sea 
(SNS)- 
Doggerbank SEA, EIA, Coexistence applied 182  31 0 
1 (NC designation 
after ORE approval 
in Doggerbank) 
Strait of Sicily 
(SoS) SEA, EIA, Coexistence avoided 2 (no aprovals yet) 0 0 0 
Celtic Sea 
SEA, EIA, Special permit for Natura 2000, 
MSP guidance, Coexistence avoided Data yet to be given 
1 local/ 2 
national 
Data yet to be 
given 
Data yet to be 
given 
Malta SEA, EIA, Coexistence applied 
3 (1 coincides with MPA, 
designation of MPA 
came later) 0 0 0 
 
For the rest of the cases, although coxistence is allowed, only in the PFOW, Sweden, Malta and 
Doggerbank it is applied. Hence for these four cases the equilibrium is ORE1, NC1. 
What is happening with the rest of the cases where coexistence is allowed but not applied? In the 
previous section the simplified game was described without considering parameters that in reality affect 
ORE and NC policy making and implementation, and may influence the equilibrium of the game. In each 
location, the solution depends not only on the strategies chosen from each player and their relative 
payoffs, but also on the players’ power.  
Since NC1 seems to be a strategy at least as good as NC2 for the NC authorities in all cases, the focus 
should be given to the strategies chosen from the ORE developer. Therefore, factors that may affect 
whether the developer will choose ORE1 or ORE2, common to all locations, must be considered, These 
factors are (1) conservation targets achievement; (2) application of the precautionary principle; (3) 
application of the polluter pays principle; (4) energy targets achievement (from renewables in general); 
(5) energy independence achievement; (6) new ORE technologies testing; (7) investments in fossil fuels 
extraction enhancement; (8) fisheries sector promotion. The first three factors influence ORE1 negatively 
and the rest five factors influence ORE1 positively (and vice versa for ORE2). Other factors that could 
affect renewable energy development, independently of its interaction to NC, are: price distortions, 
failure of the market to value the public benefits of renewables, and the social cost of fossil fuel 
technologies, inadequate information, institutional barriers to grid interconnection, high transaction costs 
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due to small project size, high financing costs because of lender unfamiliarity, and perceived risk [52]. But 
here the focus is given to those that influence the coexistence of ORE and NC. 
For comparison purposes among locations, an assessment matrix (Table 3) is used. Each factor gets a 
score in terms of its priority for spatial decision making. The ranking scale is: 2=high priority, 1=medium 
priority, 0=no priority. The scores of the factors were given by experts i.e. researchers conducting case 
study research in MESMA. In order to calculate how either ORE1 or ORE2 is influenced for each location, 
the sign of the scores of either the first three or the last five factors should be changed respectively. The 
analysis from now is focused on ORE1, so factors 1, 2 and 3 will get a minus (-) which indicates the 
negative effect of these factors to ORE1. 
   
Table 3 Average aggregated score of factors that affect strategy ORE1/ location 
Location Factor 1  Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7   Factor 8 Average score 
Sweden -2 -2 -2 1 0 0 0 1 -0,5 
Poland -2 -2 -2 1 1 0 0 1 -0,375 
Barents Sea -2 -2 -2 1 0 2 2 1 0 
Basque country -2 -1 0 2 2 2 0 2 0,625 
BPNS -2 -2 -1 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Greece -1 -1 -1 1 1 0 1 0 -0,25 
PFOW -1 -1 -2 2 2 2 0 1 0,6 
SNS (Dogger bank) -1 -1 -1 2 0 0 0 0 -0,125 
SoS -2 -2 0 0 0 0 1 1 -0,3 
Celtic Sea Data to be delivered  
Malta Data to be delivered 
 
Then, the scores of all factors per location are averaged (shown in the last right column of table 3). The 
average score is an indicator of whether ORE should choose ORE1 or ORE2. The highest average score 
would be 1,25 and the lowest would be -0,75. The highest score for ORE1 is calculated if the first three 
factors get 0 and the last five factors get 2. The opposite is followed in order to calculate the lowest 
average score. The closer to 1,25 the more preferable ORE1 is. The closer to -0,75 the more preferable 
ORE2 should be. The average scores for ORE1 per location are visualized in the form of a spider graph 
which compares the scores of ORE1 among locations. 
The spider graph in Figure 1 clearly shows to which extent ORE1 is preferable for each location. With 0,6 
for PFOW and 0.625 for the Basque country (case study) ORE1 seems more possible than ORE2. However, 
the ORE developer actually follows this strategy only in the PFOW. For the Basque country the choice of 
ORE1 cannot be reflected in practice as only one ORE project exists for the moment. This project does not 
overlap with NC.  
It is remarkable that in Sweden and Dogger bank) there is already one approved ORE project in a MPA 
while according to the graph Swedish and Dogger Bank ORE developers would not chose ORE1. This can 
be explained due to the reason that the areas where ORE and NC coexist were declared as MPAs after the 
relevant ORE projects were licensed. 
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Figure 1 ORE1 score for each location 
This phenomenon gives the impression that an approach of “first comes first served” engaged from a 
government could fundamentally affect the designation of ORE and MPAs. Therefore, it becomes obvious 
that above factors are not enough to reflect in detail the reason why coexistence is not actually followed 
in some cases. Hence, in order to facilitate the interpretation of above results, a number of additional, 
national factors or causes (provided by MESMA researchers) are examined. Of these causes, again, some 
influence ORE1 positively and some others negatively. In Table 4 the existence of these additional factors 
in each location is given with X. From this table BPNS is excluded (coexistence is prohibited by law). The 
analysis refers only to the national level. In the results presented in table 4, the major cause preventing 
coexistence in practice is the uncertainty on the actual NC value of the area. If the total NC value of an 
area could be calculated then the actual losses from coexistence could be assessed as well. On the other 
hand, if the possible harm of ORE could be absolutely assessed then actual pros and cons of coexisentenc 
could be calculated. To date, the lack of optimal space for ORE seems to be important only for one case 
(PFOW – Scotland). However, this can become important in the future for other countries as well, as the 
exploitation of marine space is not a static situation. 
Two other factors emerging at all locations, but without explicitnegative or positive influence on 
coexistence are: a) the fact that not all MPAs are officially designated yet, and b) the free interpretation of 
the term “national priority” when characterising national objectives. These two issues can be used either 
in favour or against coexistence. Some countries may take advantage of the fact that a candidate MPA is 
not officially designated and prevent ORE in this area, while some others may use this excuse to allow ORE 
development in a candidate MPA because there is no legal protection going on there. The same applies 
for the later issue. For some countries national priority might be ORE and thus this would be allowed 
anywhere and for some others national priority might be the protection of NC values for the common 
good and use the need for NC whenever possible.  
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Table 4 Existing causes that prevent coexistence of ORE and NC in the national level for each case 
Negative causes  
Basque 
Country  Sweden   Poland  
Barents 
Sea  
Celtic 
Sea  
SNS 
Dogger 
bank  SoS  Malta  Greece PFOW Yes No 
Uncertainty of the actual 
NC value of the areas 
 
 
X X X X X X X X X  9 1 
Uncertainty of the actual 
harm of ORE to NC X X X X X X X X X  9 1 
Conflict between 
national and local 
priorities and power  X      X  X  3 7 
Public opposition/ 
lobbying of coastal 
municipalities  X  X    X  X  4 6 
Higher cost  for 
developers 
(compensation 
measures in case of 
damage)   X X  X X   X  5 5 
Long administrative 
procedures  X      X X X  4 6 
Scale differences     X X X     3 7 
Positive causes             
Need for optimised use  X    X  X X  X 5 5 
MPAs designation came 
after ORE licensing   X     X X  X 4 6 
Lack of available space 
for ORE 
         X 
1 9 
 
5. Discussion: A mechanism to facilitate coexistence 
The uncertainty regarding the risk of damage and the real NC value of an area seem to be the most 
important reasons for avoiding coexistence of ORE and NC. In the case where ORE installations in 
alternative sites are able to support the fulfilment of renewable energy objectives, coexistence is not an 
issue. But what is happening where there is still a long way to go for renewable energy objectives and the 
space is limited? In the latter case, where there is a risk of damage to a designated MPA, planning 
authorities should consider the use of conditions or planning obligations in the interest of NC. If MPAs 
have already been defined through MSP, then negotiations for coexistence between the NC authorities 
and ORE developers should take place. Here NC authorities can set some rules for the game and influence 
the final solution and lead the result. Game theory helps policy makers to focus on incentives faced by 
individuals who make a decision and those faced by others who react to the initial decision. These 
incentives are explored in the present section as a mechanism to facilitate coexistence. The goal is to 
design rules of the game in such a way that a desired set of outcomes is an equilibrium of the game [53]. 
The equilibrium is the optimisation of the use of marine space through coexistence. A benefit should be 
set for both ORE developers and NC authorities that they would lose in case they do not play the game. 
Following types of gains for NC are considered:  
ORE facilities can provide effective protection for surrounding areas of seabed which require a high level 
of protection for conservation (including fisheries) purposes along with potential creation of Reef effects 
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and No-take zones [20][25]. Here ORE as an economic activity yields habitat protection as a byproduct. It 
is not conservation per se that delivers the benefit, but conservation may indirectly result from the 
pursuit of the benefit. However this type of benefit is only ensured after installations have taken place at 
the area. 
Donations or actions made by ORE for NC, even though the ORE activity has no direct negative impact on 
nature. This approach is well suited to the assumption that is presented in [18] that more investments 
should be engaged from the economic domain in order to favor NC [20][25].  
Biodiversity offsetting and developer contributions [54] in order to achieve benefits for nature 
conservation over and above those required for mitigation (S106 agreements, PGS) [55][56][57]. 
Biodiversity offsets are conservation activities, funded typically by project developers, that are designed 
to compensate for the residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development and 
persisting after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been implemented. The goal of 
biodiversity offsets is to achieve no net loss, or preferably a net gain, of biodiversity on the ground with 
respect to species composition, habitat structure and ecosystem services, including livelihood aspects. 
Offsets should only be considered at the end of the mitigation hierarchy where unavoidable residual 
impacts remain [58]. For more information on how developers can contribute to the enhancement of 
marine nature conservation the reader can refer to [59][60][61]. 
Integration of the cost for environmental damage in ORE insurance cost that covers the full net present 
value of the ecosystem in case of loss. 
The renting (leasing) cost of an area should increase proportionally to that areas NC value. 
For ORE developers the incentives could be: 
Breaks on governmental levies such as taxes, fees or tariffs that grant advantages or exemptions for 
activities that are beneficial for conservation and/or sustainable use.  
Subsidies should be provided to activities considered conducive to conservation. This is a way of 
rewarding ORE for benefiting NC.  
However the developers can only make use of these incentives after they have proved that ORE is 
beneficial for NC or at least it does not harm the environment. 
Provided above incentives, the game changes as in table 5. Three scenarios are possible, according to the 
following analysis. 
 
Table 5 Modified ORE-NC game 
Harm NC1 NC2 
ORE1 1,1 0,0 
ORE2 -1,0 0,1 
Not harm NC1 NC2 
ORE1 2,0 1,0 
ORE2 -2,0 -1,0 
NC enhancement NC1 NC2 
ORE1 2,2 1,-2 
ORE2 -2,1 -1,-1 
In the first scenario i.e. ORE harms the ecosystem. In this case both the developer and the NC authority 
need to be given incentives as above in order to participate in the game. The equilibrium is ORE1, NC1 
(1,1). Although the developer is allowed access in the MPA he does not get the highest payoff (i.e. 2) 
because he bares the cost of providing promised benefits for NC. So ORE1 gets 1. NC1 could get 2 since 
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the authority has an extra gain from the benefits provided by the developer, but only gets 1 because the 
gain is reduced by the harm caused by ORE. In the second scenario i.e. ORE does not harm the ecosystem. 
The equilibrium is again ORE1, NC1 (2, 0). Here the developer is allowed to use the area and he gets the 
highest payoff (i.e. 2). NC1 gets 0 since there is nothing for the authority to gain or lose when the 
developer cause no harm. Finally, in the third scenario when ORE enhances NC, the equilibrium is once 
again the ORE1, NC1 (2,2). Here both the developer and the authority have only benefits by following 
these strategies. The developer proves that he does not harm and even enhance NC and the authority 
gains in terms of conservation value. 
As the above theoretical models show, in all scenarios ORE1, NC1 is the equilibrium (best combination of 
payoffs). This combination of payoffs means coexistence. The equilibrium solution is ensured when the 
site owner’s (NC) willingness-to-accept a given payment level and the developer’s (ORE) willingness-to-
pay is equal. In the present study the NC authority is perceived as the supplier of the site and the ORE 
developer is the one who demands the area. The goal is to have market transactions either reflecting the 
value of biodiversity benefits, or the cost of biodiversity loss. Hence, a first step would be to create the 
underlying institutional framework that enables a well-managed exchange between those who supply and 
those who demand the area at stake. Where there are multiple users with unrestricted access to a marine 
area as a resource, they will compete away the value of the resource and overexploit it in the process. 
Government policies that aim to use markets must restrict access via either property rights mechanisms 
or other restrictions on use. These restrictions serve the same purpose as well-defined property rights: 
they generate incentives to invest in the resource [62]. An ideal solution would be property rights for NC 
in the area and resources ensured for conservation, which are in essence held in common (so-called 
“common pool” or “open-access” resources), and the concomitant leasing of marine resources 
(submerged land, the water column, and the airspace above) to prospective developers [63]. The 
restricted access in MPAs reflects the idea of a restricted property. For the allocation of limited resources 
or goods, especially of public goods, various choice mechanisms can be selected by the relevant authority 
e.g the public authority may select some specific auction mechanism. Different types of auctions are then 
compared along several criteria: high reservation value for the buyer, high profit for the seller, low 
possibility of manipulation [64].  
 
6. Conclusions 
The findings of this study are the following: 
 In 10 out of 11 European marine areas NC authorities don’t prohibit ORE in MPAs, although 
theoretically the “right” strategy to choose would be to prohibit ORE in MPAs  
 However in practice coexistence doesn’t occur so often 
 Apparently, the strategy that the ORE developer will choose, is the one that affects coexistence 
 The choice of the developer’s strategy is explicitly or implicitly affected from a number of factors 
as presented previously 
Therefore, according to the equilibrium solution presented in section 5 that supports coexistence of ORE 
and NC, a government could introduce measures to force the multiple use of space and only grant a 
permit if co-use is possible. This could encourage the co-use by having parties with an interest to 
negotiate the terms e.g. ORE developers and other users of the marine space. Therefore, at a strategic 
level there would be a preference in both planning and permitting towards multiple uses as opposed to 
single use. This would encourage innovation and the use of modern technique(s).  In an investment level a 
new use should be willing to invest in technologies to be compatible with other uses. This would minimize 
exclusion zones and promote the co-use of marine space. In general, innovation is the key to promoting 
multiple use of marine space in MSP processes [65]. Recognizing that sea space is finite, MSP should 
guarantee a sparingly use of space and actively encourage co-use. Rather than breaking fresh ground, 
planners do their best to promote the use of “used” sea space. This means making good use of synergies 
and considering options for multiple uses of sea space wherever this is possible [66]. Maximizing spatial 
efficiency and minimizing conflicts of use is not a one-off, but a dynamic process that needs to respond to 
actual developments in sea use. As stated above, patterns of use can shift as a result of changing 
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dynamics within individual sectors and in response to external forces; this can alter the balance of uses 
and the relative significance of certain uses over others. It follows that monitoring of external driving 
forces is particularly important in the marine context [67]. As a planning system, MSP should contribute to 
minimization of the impacts that developments have on the marine environment through the avoidance, 
reduction or compensation of cumulative effects; and to the delivery of wider nature conservation gains 
[18]. Although much uncertainty remains on environmental effects of ORE, this is not a reason in itself to 
block ORE. Many of the questions will only be answered once ORE installations are in place. The best way 
to address uncertainty is to use an adaptive environmental management (or a step- by step learning) 
approach.  
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